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"Each generation must rekill its phoenixes"
(Samuelson, 1964, p. 149)

Introduction.
Two years ago, in June, 1977, the Ford Foundation __in col
laboration with the Central Bank of Greece sponsored a two-day conference
on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP).

The papers presented at that symposium

were published by th~_Journal of International Economics in
its May 1978 issue.

They cover a wide area related to exchange rates

and prices from analyses of the historical evidence in the early 20's
to the use of PPP as partial guidance of exchange rate management policies.
When it was first decided that a sunmary of the proceedings
should be written up, it was with the understanding that the purpose of
such endeavor would be to highlight the main conclusions reached in
Athens on the theoretical and empirical questions posed by PPP and its
usefulness as a policy tool.

The con_ference in Athens

was the most recent round of a debate which formafly started
and continued in the 1940's and later on in the 1960's.

in ~he 1Q?n'~

The resurgence of

interest in PPP in the 1970 1 s can be mainly attributed to our recent ex
perience with flexible exchange rates and more specifically to the highly
volatile nature of their movement.

The wide and often unanticipated

fluctuations in the price of key_ currencies has increased uncertainty in
international financial markets and has intensified the search for those
"fundamental relationships" whi,~h determine the equilibrium value of real
exchange rates both in the short and the long-run.

In such environment
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the Purchasing Power Parity doctrine provides a convenient starting point
for analyztng the determinants of the "true value" of exchange rates.

It was only after carefully rereading the JIE volume and related
papers that it became apparent that Purchasing Power Parity
remains an elusive concept, defined and used differently by
individual authors.

While it is probably true that

11

under the skin of

any international economist lies a deep-seated belief in some variant of
11
the PPP theory of the exchange rate , (Dornbusch and Krugman, 1976, p. 540),

the variants cover a wide range from simple truisms to more sophisticated
theories of exchange rate determination.
The theoretical foundations of PPP have been further obscured by
empirical tests of the parity relationship.

The very nature of regression

analysis, the econometric tool most often used in recent studies of PPP, often
conveys the impression that PPP is essentially a causal relationship
between relative price levels and the exchange rate (absolute version of
PPP) or their rates of change (relative version of PPP).

Within this

framework, debates on either version of PPP have focused on such issues
as the appropriate price vector (or index) to be used, the appropriate
base year period for time-series analysis, and the presence of systematic
divergencies of internal price ratios which would involve consistent
biases in the computation of parities from general price levels.

However

important such issues might be for meaningful empirical tests of the
parity doctrine_, they have over$h~dowed a considerable number of 1110re
fundamental theoretical questions.

3

It is the objective of this essay to focus on and hopefully dis
entangle the sometimes implicit and foggy statements regarding the
nature of the parity doctrine which are submerged in attempts to
prove or disprove the empirical validity of the concept.

In that respect,

at least methodologically, this review article is an extension if not a
restatement of Samuelson's 1964 paper on the subject in
the sense that more emphasis is placed on the underlying theoretical
structure rather than the characteristics of competing versions of PPP. 1
This approach is also in line with the spirit of recent literature (Myhrman,
1976; Isard,1978; Michaely,1978) as well as the papers that were presented
in Athens.
Section I of this essay provides a survey of competing interpretations
of the Purchasing Power Parity doctrine:

(R)

RS R

spatial or commodity

arbitrage relationship; (b) as a "causal" relationship usually running from
relative price levels to _t.he exchange rate but also more recently, from
exchange rates to prices and finally (c) an equilibrium relationship
between two endogenous variables (the ~elative pric~ level and the exchange rate)
both of which are determined jointly as_ functions of exogenous variables.
Even though most recent studies espouse this latter viewpoint, there exist
important differences across them regarding the kind of disturbances which
are assumed to be prevalent (real vs. monetary), the process of exchange

1

For a comprehensive survey of the literature and the debates
surrounding PPP as it has evolved, historically, see Officer(1976)".
(

J
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rate determination and finally the time horizon pertinent to the analysis.
As will be seen in Section I these give rise to different hypotheses as to
the nature of the PPP relationship, its validity and its relevance as a policy
tool.
Section II of the essay reviews recent empirical work on PPP both
in terms of methodology and most important findings.
The concluding section evaluates the usefulness of PPP in light
of recent events and in the context of a wider search for meaningful
criteria of exchange rate management.

I.

Alternative Interpretations

Purchasing Power Parity:

Starting from the premise that exchange rates are generally kept
in line with relative price levels, the ?urchasing Power Parity (PPP) doctrine
states that the "true" value of currencies should be intimately linked
to their internal purchasing power.
In its absolute version, PPP implies that the equilibrium value
of the exchange rate between the currencies of any pair of countries should
be equal to the ratio of the relative price levels; in its relative
version, that the rate of change of the exchange rate should be equal to
the difference in the rates of inflation.

tnS

t

= tn

*pPt
t

In logarithmic terms,

I
(absolute version)

(1)

5
and

6£nSt = 6£nPt - 6inPt* (relative version)

(1 ')

where,
St= ratio of domestic to foreign currency units;
Pt= domestic price index;
P* = foreign price index.
t

Thus, Purchasing Power Parity

is

both a positive and a normative

hypothesis about the value of bilateral or effective real exchange rates which,
if the theory holds, should be unity in long-run equilibrium .
The discussion in this section of the essay will be limited to
the normative statement and its theoretical foundations while empirical
work on the magnitude and sourcesof actual deviations of exchange rates
from their PPP level will be reviewed in Section II.
As was suggested in the introductio n, a careful review of the
literature would indicate that there exist at least three different
theoretical interpretati ons

of the Purchasing Power Parity doctrine.

These are taken up below.
a.

PPP as a Spatial Arbitrage Relationshi p
This is the view that equates PPP with what is commonly known

as the "law of one price".

!'
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At the individual commodity level and in the absence of transport
costs and other trade impediments, perfect arbitrage would ensure that
the price of each commodity is equalized across countries.

In that case,

the domestic price of foreign currency is synonymous with the ratio of
the relative internal prices of the commodity in question, and the same
holds true for their rates of change.

In other words, for each connnodity

i,

(2) and

(2')

where,

St= ratio

of domestic to foreign currency units at time t;

Pi= domestic price of commodity i;
P* = foreign price of commodity i.
1

If (2) and (2') hold for each commodity then it follows that they will
hold for any equally-weighted price level or price index series.

As

Samuelson (1964) poinLs out; if individual countries use
different weights in computing Pfice indexes, there would be no ~eason
to expect the "law of one price" to hold for indexes across countries.

7
These aggregation problems are often significant since countries' tastes,
economic structures, and accounting practices vary widely.

Furthermore,

this view of PPP as essentially an arbitrage relationship between traded
goods assumes perfect information and overlooks the importance of trade
distortions and transportation costs.

As Kravis and Lipsey (1978) show,

informational imperfections and the presence and assymetries of trade impedi
ments make the equalization of traded-good prices across countries highly
improbable both on the individual and aggregate commodity levels.
In moving from equalization of individual commodity prices to
equalization of traded-good prices the distinction between the actual
and the equilibrium real exchange rate becomes obscure.

As Samuelson

points out,if trade costs and impediments were zero and accounting practices
were. identical,

11

every ruling exchange rate would turn out to be the PPP

equilibrium rate" (Samuelson,1964, p. 147).

In econometric applications,

the computed results turn out to be different from the PPP ones precisely
because of such different weightings and the-presence of transportation
costs and trade impediments.

Testing the law· of One price thus becomes

a test of the magnitude and importance of trade distortions, cross-country
asymmetries and information lags.
As Frenkel (1978, p. 172) points out, those who adopt
a strict view of PPP as a traded~good arbitrage relationship tend to
advocate the use of traded-good.prices rather than more general price
vectors for meaningful tests of PPP.
modity prices
arbitrage view.

Emphasis on

individual com

however, is not/synonymous with espousal of a commodity
For example, the following statement by Ohlin
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is quoted by Frenkel (1978) as representative of the commodity arbitrage
view:
Foreign exchange rates have nothing to do
with the wholesale commodity price level as such
but only with individual prices •••
(Ohlin, 1967, p. 290)

Ohlin's point however, taken in context, is that the use of aggregate
price levels does not tell you anything about the equilibrium exchange
rate and that "changes in individual prices may be relevant (for exchange
rate determination), even though the level of commodity prices happens
to be constant" (Ohlin, 1967, p. 290).
The use of aggregate price levels or indexes such as the consumer
prlce iuclex ( CPI) or the GNP deflatur in cases where an arbitrage view of
PPP is espoused, is usually justified on the ground that
prices of traded and non-traded comroodi ties 100_ve to.2ether.

The extremP.

position, often typical of monetarist models, is that countries produce
one homogeneous good whose price is equalized across countries through
perfect commodity arbitrage.

More frequently, non-traded goods are

explicitly introduced but their price is kept in line with that of
traded goods thro_ugh high degrees of substitution in consumption.
The price adjustment is assumed in most cases to be instantaneous;
as .Dornbusch (1978, -p~ 5)points out,

the potential limited

I

substitutability between supply sources, the overall state of slack in
the economy and the expected pers!i~tence of real price changes are usually
disregarded.

So is the presence of biases in the calculated parity relation,

ship due to systematic divergencies of internal price ratios across
countries.

As Balassa (1961, 1964) and others have demonstrated (see Officer,

1976, for an extensive review), even if perfect commodity arbitrage ensures

9

the equalizat ion of prices of traded goods, higher productiv ity growth in
the non-trade d good sector of developed countries would require a rising
internal price ratio of traded to non-trade d goods in the higher-inc ome
countries .

Thus, high substitut ability in demand among goods is not a

sufficien t condition for the use of general price levels to test for PPP.
As Officer points out a similar shortcomi ng would arise in tests of the
relative version of PPP ~f there exists a systemati c "increase (decrease )
over time in the advanced country's productiv ity advantage " (Officer,1 976,
p. 22).

The presence of productiv ity or structura l differenc es across

countries which cause differenc es in internal relative prices is one of
the most serious criticism s of the PPP relations hip.

As we will see

below, it applies equally well to both "causal" and/or "equilibri um"
views of the parity doctrine.
Despite these criticism s this approach to PPP is widely adopted in
studies conerning the internatio nal transmiss ion of inflation under a fixed
exchange rate regime.

According to Genberg (1978),

Discussio ns of the transmiss ion of inflation naturally
start with a price increase abroad and then try to
identify the channel by which domestic prices are
affected. The most common such channel is probably
that suggest~d by the arbitrage hypothesi s. This
hypothes is, which is also referred to as the traded
goods model or the'law of one price',sim ply states
that the price of a homogeneous commodity must be.
the s.ame in all countries provided the market for
this commodity is interna~i onally integrate d
(Genberg, 1978, p. 248).
Thus,
Purchasin g Power ia~ity under fixed
exchange rates implies that inflation rates must,
subject to certain reservati ons, be equal in all
countries of an integrate d world economy •••
(Genberg, 1978, p. 252).
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A similar view of PPP under fixed exchange rates characteriz es a
number of other recent studies on the internation al transmissio n of price
disturbance s such as those by Dornbusch (1973), Connolly and Taylor (1976),
Swoboda (1977), Papaefstrat iou (1977).

Apart from modelling differences

and substantial variation as to the predicted path of adjustment of the
internal price ratio following external disturbance s, all of these studies
share the underlying assumptions of perfectly integrated commodity markets
for traded goods and high substitutab ility of domestic and internation ally
traded commodities .
The identificat ion of PPP with a spatial commodity arbitrage re
lationship also applies to models of flexible exchange rates.

Dornbusch

and Krugman (1976) for example, in their study.of short-run exchange
rate determinati on, identify and evaluate the PPP doctrine as essentially
a spatial arbitrage relationshi p; their criticism of PPP focuses on the
unrealistic nature of such assumptions as perfect integration of
collllit>dity

markets (the 'law of one price'), no transport costs or duties

(pertinent to the absolute version of PPP), and constant terms of trade
following external disturbance s (pertinent to the relative version of PPP);
these assumptions however, are not necessary, as they themselves note, in
a Casselian "neutral-mo ney" model in which Purchasing power Parity is not
at all dependent on arbitrage.

I

I
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-

Haberler (1975) states a view similar to Dornbusch and Krugman's as
to the nature of the PPP doctrine:

The proposition that general price levels
different countries are connected through
prices of internationally traded goods is
foundation of the Purchasing Power Parity
trine ••••

in
the
the
doc

(Haberler, 1975, p. 24).
Similarly Wihlborg (1978) argues that,

PPP between two currencies/countries, holds when all
commodities have the same price in both countries ••••
(Wihlborg,1978, p. 4).
In their studies Kravis and Lipsey (1971, 1974, 1977a, 1977b, 1978)
identify their tests of the 'law of one price'and the behavior of relative
prices as tests of the PPP relationship and the pure monetarist approach
to the balance of payments.
Thus, the identification of PPP essentially with perfect commodity
arbitrage is quite conunon even in recent literature.

Table 1

summarizes the main arguments and counter-arguments raised in reference
to this view.

I
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TABLE 1:

THE 'LAW OF ONE PRICE':

ARGUMENT

A.

MAJOR OBJECTIONS

Perfect arbitrage on the
individual commodity level
for traded goods (i)

st

P.

- Imperfect information
- Absence of transportation costs
and trade impediments

l.

c::

t.R.nS

B.

A SUMMARY OF THE DEBATE

pi*

t

= t.R-nPi - t.inP *i

- Asymmetric changes in transportation
costs, and trade impediments.

Perfect arbitrage of
n

traded goods

PT=

- Imperfect information
- Absence of transportation costs
and trade impediments
- Aggregation problems--differences
in weights
- Distinction between actual and

L wiPi

i=l

*

P..,
l.

C.

equilibrium

Perfect arbitrage across all
goods

!

t.tnS

t

= t.tnP - t.tnP *

t::A1..:h,:m1:,t::

1.dtt::,

- Imperfect information
- Absence of transportation costs and
trade impediments
- Aggregation problems--differences
in weights
.
- Distinction between actual and
equilibrium exchange rate
- Biases due to systematic differences
in productivity in the non-traded
good sector
- Low substitutability of traded and
non-traded commodities in consumption or
supply.
- Asymmetric changes in transportation
costs and trade impediments
- Biases due to systematic changes
in productivity in the non-traded
good sector.
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b.

PPP as a Caus al Rela tions hip

and Keyn es (1923 )
In thei r writ ings on PPP Cass el (1916 , 1918 )
equi libri um valu e of
focu sed on the dete rmin ation of the "true " or
exch ange rate s.
Cass el wrot e:
The purc hasin g powe r pari ties repr esen t the
of
true equi libri um of the exch ange s, and it is
It
grea t prac tical valu e to know those pari ties.
to
wish
we
is in fact to them we have to refe r when
e
whos
s
get an idea of the real valu e of curre ncie
exch ange s are subj ect to arbi trary and some times
wild fluct ~atio ns •••
(Cas sel, 1921 , p. 38)

for PPP the equi vale nt
In some of his earl ier writ ings Cass el used
thus appa rent that PPP, at
term "the oret ical rate of exch ange ". It is
2
valu e of the real exch ange
leas t for its orig inat or, was the equi libri um
ange rate defin ed as the
rate quite dist inct from the rulin g real exch
pric es. Desp ite this
ratio of exch ange rate to the ratio of rela tive
and the long -run nor the
view , neith er the sepa ratio n betw een shor t-run
al relat ions hip are altog ethe r
disti ncti on betw een an equi libri um vs. a caus
to the fact that PPP was and
clea r in the liter atur e. This is main ly due
of the
stil l is seen by many ~uth ors as an exten sion
quan tity theo ry of JOOney in an open economy.

3

In his insig htfu l

2

PPP doct rine is stil l
Whet her or not Cass el was the foun der of the
to form alize the conc ept as
a disp utab le poin t; he is the firs t, howe ver,
it is pres ently known and test ~i'em piric ally.
3.Th

see Holmes (196 7).
e eval uatio n of Cass el's posi tion is hard er;
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review of the early debates on exchange rate determination Johan Myhrman
(1976) stresses the similarities between the positions held by the
Cap party in 18th century Sweden or by the Bullionists in England fifty
years later.with those held in our days by the proponents of the 100netary
approach to the balance of payments.

According to both Ricardo (1811,

1821) and Wheatley (1803, 1807, 1819), two of the 100st prominent Bullion
ists, both the price level and consequently the exchange rate were deter
mined by the quantity of note issues; the real effects of side distur
bances such as food shortages, changes in emmigrant remntitances, military
expenditures and the like were clearly temporary as they were fully
anticipated by private market participants.
If at some initial equilibrium position, PPP holds so that the
exchange rate is inversely proportional to the price level in the two
trading partners, the expansion in the monetary base would under full em
ployment conditions increase the overall domestic price level without af
fecting relative commodity prices.

The same might ·possibly hold true as

Michaely points out (1978), in the case of some real disturbances such as
economic growth or an increase in the foreign price level, if their effects
were "neutral", i.e. succeeded to maintain the same level of excess demand

in the system for all commodities and assets.

As this "neutrality"

however

tends to be unlikely in the presence of real disturbances, the theory has
been traditionally cast in terms of monetary shocks.

(
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The ensuing change in the internal price level following a mone
tary disturban ce would then be completel y offset by a change in the
nominal exchange rate,
there being no other reason for the fluctuatio ns of exchange
than to maintain the par of produce . • •
(Wheatley , 1819, p. 21)
Thus, PPP in this framework is intimatel y linked (a) to the prevalenc e
of monetary disturban ces, (b) the quantity theory of rooney, (c) the notion
that the purchase of foreign exchange is for the purpose of securing
purchasin g power in some particula r currency (Kalamoto usakis, 1978, p. 164),
and (d) the presumpti on that movements in the exchange rate do not in turn
cause movements in relative prices within each country.
This version of PPP theory is thus consisten t with a clearly
establish ed causal relations hip that, as we have seen, runs
from monetary disturban ces to the price level and then to exchange rates.
So long as the price level is determine d by the money stock,and \elocity
and real income are held constant, the only truly endogenou s variable is
the exchange rate.

This line of argument is also at the core of the 1wne~

tary theory of the balance of payments (Frenkel, 1976; Bilson, 1978), and
is implicit in a numer of econometr ic tests of the PPP relations hip
which regress the exchange rate on relative prices (see Section II for
an extensive review).

Given this framework , the distinctio n

between PPP as a causal vs. an equilibriu m

relations hip becomes

problema tic.
I '

As it was pointed out in the Athens Conferenc e, the issue that is

raised here is analogous to that posed by

interest parity,

or even the
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Phill ips curve

relat ionsh ip in a close d economy frame work:

in all

en two varia bles
three cases there is a stipu lated relat ionsh ip betwe
ation ally mean ingfu l;
which requi res a theor y behin d it to become oper
line of caus ality is
once a theor y is propo t.mde d, howe ver, and a clear
distin guish ed from a
estab lishe d, an equil ibriu m relat ionsh ip canno t be
causa l one.
relat ionsh ip as
Even as early as the 1920 's critic ism of the PPP
follo wing disti nct lines :
prese nted schem atica lly above devel oped along the
ioned in view
The oper ation al valid ity of the conce pt was quest
tests of eithe r abso lute or
of the inher ent econo metri c probl ems posed with
of base year perio d, chang e
relat ive versi on of the PPP relat ionsh ip (choi ce
.
in trade imped iment s, prod uctiv ity diffe rence s, etc.)
on the
On the theo~ etica l level most objec tions focus ed
proce ss of excha nge rate deter mina tion.

The natur e and signi fican ce

was debat ed in
of the distu rbanc es which moved the exch~ nge rate
er times (Myhrman,
the inter war perio d as vehem ently as it was in earli
Cass ei resta ted and
1976 ). While propo nents of PPP, and most notab ly
tanti al disag reem ent
refin ed the basic Ricar dian posit ion, there was subs
up the theo retic al
am:>ng econo mists as to the basic tenet s that made
frame work.
asize d the role
In his Trac t on Mone tary Refor m, Keyn es (1923 ) emph
t of PPP. For Keyn es,
of the e~ge nous distu rbanc es in the reest ablis hmen
that purch asing powe r
if distu rbanc es are mone tary "then we may expe ct
befor e long" (Keyn es,
parit y and excha nge value will com~ toget her again
.
(

1923 , p. 95).

of
If howe ver distu rbanc es are on accou nt of movements
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capital,

or reparation payments, or changes in the relative efficiency

of labour, "then the equilibrium point between purchasing power parity
and the rate of exchange may be modified permanently" (Keynes, 1923, p. 97).
This is the result of disturbances in the "equations of exchange."

A

similar point was made almost twenty years later by Taussig who argued
that,
If something happens to disturb the conditions of demand
for export or imports; or if invisible items enter which
disturb the barter terms of trade - then the purchasing
power parity does not hold.
(Taussig, 1941, pp. 357f)
Thus, the prevalence of monetary disturbances is crucial for the continua
tion of PPP as an equilibrium value for the real exchange rate.

Non-llt)netary

disturbances and real structural changes would in all probability change
relative prices internally and would cause substantial deviations of the
equilibrium real exchange rate from its PPP level (Samuelson, 1964;
Officer. 1976) •
The traditional formulation of PPP was also questioned with respect

to the stipulated links between prices and exchange rates (Zolotas, 1928;
Einzig, 1935).

It was argued that both government and private participants

can intervene in the foreign exchange market for portfolio allocation pur

poses, rather than solely for the procurement of foreign exchange to meet
current account flows.

Kalamotousakis' review of Zolotas'.contribu

tion to the PPP debate for example points to the latter's discussion

of

"qualitative factors" behind the process of exchange rate determination.
As early as 1928 Zolotas argued that under conditions of "instabil-

'

ity" in international financial markets the motive to secure purchasing
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power assumes lesser importance and is replaced instead by "qual
itative motives," namely (1) to place funds abroad and (2) to
hedge or even speculate against losses that may result from a potential
devaluation of the national currency (Kalamotousakis, 1978, p. 165).
This view as pointed out in the JIE volume is essentially the same as
the asset market view expounded and formalized recently by Branson (1975),
Dornbusch (1976), Kouri (1976) and others.

In such a world, expectations

about future exchange rate developments are important determinants of
activity in the foreign exchange markets and can cause substantial
deviations of the real exchange rate from its PPP level.
A final set of objections to the "causal" ' view of PPP as was
schematically presented above concerns the specified lines of causality
from the price level to exchange rates.

According to Angell (1926):

Neither prices nor the exchanges ca~ properly
be regarded as having been the "cause" of the general
movement in any specific case. Nor was the level of
either, except in a very immediate sense, even the
"result" of the other's fluctuations. Rather, both
prices and exchange movements were common products
of a common antecedent condition •••

(Angell, 1926, p. 447)
As it was discussed earlier the causal view of PPP is intimately
linked to the theoretical framework underlying it.

Similar objections

could be and have been raised against recent tests of the PPP relation
ship which basically adopt the monetary approach to the balance of pay
ments.

Even though the authors talk of PPP as a long-run equilibrium

relationship and even though "there is no statistical method", as Frenkel
/

J

notes (1978, p. 183), "that is capable of determining causality in its
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conventional sense," one is still bound by a causal argument running
from the money stock to the exchange rate.

Recent econometric tests of

the PPP relationship are usually cast as attempts to see if either the
price or exchange-rate time series can be viewed as being econometrically
precedent to the other (Frenkel, 1978; Brillembourg, 1976).
In his recent empirical tests of absolute Purchasing Power Parity
for the February 1921-May 1925 period, Frenkel (1978) actually fotmd
that 'causality tests', as specified above, pointed to specification
of 'price equation~'

i.e., that exchange rates should be viewed as

exogenous to the price levels and thus be treated as independent vari.

ables,

U

causing

II

price level fluctuations.

In a·world where exchange

rates are determined in asset markets, this viewpoint is consistent with
the observation that asset markets typically clear faster than commodity
markets.

I~ is also theoretically consistent with a whole cluster of

arguments which point to exchange rate fluctuations as a major determinant of the
domestic price level fluctuations either through

their effects on import
..

(fora recent rev-iew,
Lowrey, 1979), or their effects on price~setting behavior by firms (Saidi,
19 77).
As a final point it should be npted that the distinction between

short and long-run was at best implicit in early theoretical formulations.

(
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The focus on the steady-state or long-run properties of the system by
passed issues concerning the short-run adjustment process and the time
lag involved prior to the reestablishmen t of PPP.

The same criticism

can be applied to studies based on a monetary approach for which the
short-run depends solely on the speed of adjustment of participants.
The distinction between·· short-run and long-run becomes much clearer in
models which espouse an asset market approach to the balance of payments.

c.

PPP as a Long-Run Equilibrium Relationship
The causal view of PPP has been traditionally linked to a world

view in which exchange rates clear commodity markets and are thus de
termined by current flows of goods and services across countries.

Changes

to changes in comparative ad

in the aggregate price level give rise

vantage and through trade flowo invcrGcly affect the price of domestic
currencies.

Thus, according to Cassel,

•.. our willingness to pay a certain price for a foreign
money must ultimately and essentially depend on the fact
that this money has a purchasing power as against commodi
ties and services in the foreign country •••
(Cassel, 1921, p. 36)
Most of the recent literature on exchange rate determination views
exchange rates as being determined jointly with interest rates in asset
markets.

It is thus the values of the existing stocks of money, real cap

ital, bonds and foreign assets together with the rate of flow of government
purchases, the tax structure and expectations that determine short-run
equilibrium values for the flow of, real income, the vector of interest rates
(

J

and prices and the values of nominal exchange rates.

These in tum yield
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values for investment, saving, the government deficit and the current
account which cause a change of the initial stock of variables that
were assumed constant in the short-run.

Long-run stock equilibrium can

thus be identified as the state in which saving, investment, and the
govenment and current account

deficits are all zero (Tobin, 1969; Branson,

1972, 1976; Kouri, 1976; Dornbusch, 1976).
What is the place of PPP in such a view?

The asset-market view

fully recognizes and integrates in a consistent framework most of the
objections reviewed earlier against a causal view of real exchange rate
determination.

It focuses on the endogenous and simultaneous determination

of exchange rates and prices; it incorporates the role of government and
private exchange market participants as portfolio holders of domestic
anu forelgn-denotnlnated assets; it explicitly introduces expectation~ as
an important determinant of real exchange rates; it finally draws a
sharp distinction between the short-run and long-run equilibrium real
exchange rate.

The long-run equilibrium real exchange rate is that real

exchange rate which is consistent with a zero current account balance.

4

Its value will depend on all the real determinants of the current accoun¼
There is no a priori reason to expect this to be the PPP value of unity.
To clarify this point it might be helpful to think of the cur~
rent account balance (CA) as a function of the real exchange rate

4
.
tong-run equilibrium could also be identified with a zero basic balance,
i.e., to include long-run capital movements above the line.

f
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(s), real income (y), the real value of assets

1~ and a shift para

meter (a), so that
CA

=

CA(s, y,

A
p'

(3)

a)

In long-run equilibrium the current-acco unt balance is equal to zero.
Assuming PPP to hold at some initial period and noting that the cur
rent account balance is ceteris paribus an increasing function of the
real exchange rate, equation (3) can be diagramatic ally presented as
follows:

0

A neutral

disturbance in Michaely's sense (Michaely, 1978)

which causes a depreciatio n of the short-run real exchange rate
but leaves domestic relative prices unchanged would improve the current
account balance if trade elasticitie s ·are not too low (point A).

In

the long-run, PPP would be reestablishe d as the incipient current
account surplus induces a net accumulatio n of foreign assets and
causes the real exchange rate to appreciate back to its initial value.
Whether or not PPP is reestablishe d even in the case of monetary dis
turbances depends critically on whether or not the current account as
/

j

a function of the real exchange rate~s, has shifted in the process due
to wealth effects or to interest payments on holdings of foreign
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assets.

If it is assumed that these are negligible or that they cancel

each other out, then PPP would in fact be reestablished.

If now the dis

turbance is identified with a change in the shift parameter (a), the value
In

of the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate is even more unclear.

terms of the previous diagram such disturbance would have involved an up
A permanent decrease in emi

ward or downward shift of the CA function.

grant remm.itances for example, will shift the CA function upwards causing
a long-run depreciation of the real exchange rate.

Thus even though the

portfolio balance approach makes both prices and exchange rates truly
endogenous, PPP's validity as an equilibrium condition critically depends
once again on the nature of external disturbances.
Transmission lags are also important.

Even in the case of monetary

or neutral disturbances the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate might
deviate from its PPP path if the'"balance of payments is quickly affected
by monetary policy measures whereas price level influences are subject
to longer lags"

(Genberg, 1978, p. 262).

Alternatively, the long-run

equilibrium real exchange rate might be close to its PPP path even in the
case of real disturbances if these are quickly transmitted across countries
and affect both economies symmetrically.

(Genberg, 1978, p. 262).

In

that case the current account balance between the relevant countries will
not be affected and the CA function will not shift.

(
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These points are not always clear in the literature.

Officer

for example argues that PPP "is either the long-run equilibrium
exchange rate or the principal determinant of it" (Officer ,1976,
p. 3), even though PPP might have nothing to do as we have seen
with the "true" long-run equilibrium real exchange rate. An excel
lent summary of the asset-market view is presented by Artus (1978) 'who
points out the consistency of this view with the large exchange rate
fluctuations observed since 1973 (Artus,1978, p. 283).

His analysis,

however, on the role of PPP in such a system is confusing:

As to the evolution of the exchange rate in the
longer run ••• the asset-market view is fully con
sistent with the traditional view that it is
essentially determined by the purchasing power
of the currency in the goods markets ••••
Deviations of the exchange rate from its PPP
value will be self-correcting in the long run
because they will give rise to current account
imbalances and a gradual change in the exchange
rate •••
(Artu~ 1978, p. 283).

And later on,

The long-run equilibrium value of the exchange
rate is, of course, a function not of the current
PPP value of the currency, but of its prospective
value. There are as many such values as sets of
alternative monetary and fiscal policies ••.•
(Artus, 1978, p. 283).
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It seems that Artus identifies here PPP with the long-run
equilibrium real exchange rate, i.e. with that value of the exchange
rate such that, given the domestic and foreign price levels, the
current account balance is equal to zero.

As we have seen, however,

the PPP value of the exchange rate need not coincide with the long
run equilibrium real exchange rate.

Thus his statement that, "the

long-run equilibrium exchange rate S* is defined as the expected
purchasing power parity between the currencies of the country con
sidered and those of the rest of the world one to two years ahead"
(Artus, 1978, p. 285) will be true only if certain restrictive as
sumptions are made regarding the nature and subsequent effects of
exogenous disturbances.
A casual idenfitication of PPP with the long-run equilibrium
real exchange rate is also implicit in Vaubel's study (Vaubel, 1978)
if only by its inclusion in the PPP volume when it deals exclusively
with the role of real exchange rates as criteria for optimum currency area questions.

While such identification is carefully avoided

in the paper itself, the abstract that precedes the study confuses
the issues.

In stating the paper's objectives, Vaubel (1978)

argues that "deviations from relative Purchasing Power Parity (real
exchange-rate changes) are suggested as a comprehensive and operational
criterion of the desirability of currency unification" __(Vaubel, 1978,
p. 319).

!
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Despite these and similar statements regarding the nature of
PPP there seems to be a consensus in the literature as to the limita
tions of the theory and its dependence on monetary or "neutral" dis
turbances.

In their criticism of the PPP relationship for example,

Kravis and Lipsey (1978, p. 198) argue that the theory "precludes the
possibility that a country as a matter of policy maintain an (exchange
rate converted) price level that is lower than that of its rivals and
thereby achieve export-led growth for any sustained period".

According

to these same authors this approach "tends to minimize the possibility
of lasting changes in the quantity composition of exports and imports
or in their price structure".

Similar reservations are shared by

Genberg in the conclusions of his empirical study:

On the other hand serious problems could arise if

a true bias were ignored in the design of target
zones or surveillance indicators for exchange rates
based on PPP. A similar difficulty, which is probably
harder to handle, appears if PPP relationships,
measured by commonly used indexes, tend to shift with
changes in relative prices of traded goods as it
appears that they do based on the preliminary esti
mates presented here •••
(Genberg,1978, p. 273)
Finally Thygesen uses similar reasoning to express caution
vis-a-vis a strict adherence to PPP rules for exchange rate management:
The second [objection] is that the rule would hinder
changes in real exchange rates, i.e. departures from
PPP, which are nec~~sary for better external equil
ibrium ••• If, indeed, real exchange-rate changes are
necessary, because real disturbances are sizeable •••
external imbalances would be perpetuated by a rule
which systematically blocked departures from PPP •••
(Thygesen,1978, p. 315)
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These reservation s and the preceding discussion hopefully put
into theoretical perspective the empirical tests of the PPP rela
tionship which have been numerous and often inconclusiv e.

II.

Purchasing Power Parity: Recent Empirical Findings

Empirical studies of the PPP relationship have been used for a
variety of purposes by policy makers and academic economists alike.
Thus PPP has been used as a test of the commodity arbitrage relation
ship, as a criterion for setting new exchange rates, as a tool for
assessing exchange rate disequilibr ia under both fixed and flexible
exchange rate regime~ and finally as a method of evaluating the rational
ity of exchange rate policies of state-tradin g economies.

Officer (1976)

has presented a comprehensi ve overview of the literature up until the
early 1970's.

Since then there have been a number of new studies which

either apply more rigorous econometric techniques to the study of
traditional questions or apply existing methodolpgy to the analysis of
recurrent processes such as the transmission of external disturbance s
across countries and the process of real exchange rate determinati on.
It is not the objective of this section to review the methodology
and findings of each of those studies; it is rather to present in a
selective way examples of econometric tests and application s of the PPP
relationshi p in light of the theoretical foundations presented in Section I.
Empirical work on PPP is ?hµs divided as between (a) tests of the
commodity arbitrage relationshi p, (b) tests of the internation al pro
pagation of disturbance s under fixed exchange rates, (c) "causality"
tests running from prices to exchange rates and finally, (d) tests
of real exchange rate variability .
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There are a number of methodologi cal problems which are common
to most empirical studies of the PPP relationship .

These are briefly

summarized below:
a.

Choice of the Price Index.

In the case where a broadly inclusive

measure of price changes is desirable for the assessment of the Purchas
ing Power Parity doctrine, the choice is between the GDP deflator which
5

is the broadest of them all but not always available , the wholesale
price index which concentrate s on "commoditie s" and thus gives a greater
weight to tradables and the consumer
price index which applies only to
,
consumer goods•(Krav is-and Lipsey, 1978, p. 200; Thygesen, 1978, p. 304-305).
b.

Identificati on of Commodities .

Even in the case of physically

identical goods "difference s in the terms of sale may involve such
different bundles of benefits in two purchasei:; Lhal the prices would
not be the same even under perfect competition " (Kravis and Lipsey, 1978, p. 203),
p. 203).

Cross-count ry product differentia tion makes the application

of the 'law of one price' even harder.

Empirical work also requires

consistent and operational definitions of such subsets of commodities

as exports, imports, traded and non-traded commodities (Kravis and Lipsey
1978, p. 201).

c.

The Choice of Base Year.

This issue is critical for tests

of the relative version of PPP since absolute PPP is assumed to hold
during the base year.

Confronted with the task of choosing a base year,

5 Genberg (1978) reports that only a few countries publish quarterly
series for this variable.

(

,
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one can either arbitrarily pick a year of "general stability," or
let the data chose it through the introduction of a constant (Genberg,
1978, p. 264).
d.

Identification of Historical Periods.

the identification of the base year.

This is related to

It concerns the specification of

the adjustment period from one equilibrium to the next, the choice
of the terminal year, but also the choice of criteria for identifying
appreciations or depreciations of the currency (Kravis and Lipsey, 1978,
p. 205; Thygesen, 1978, p. 306).
e.

Bilateral or Multilateral Measurements of PPP.

Testing

PPP bilaterally or through the use of weighted averages of foreign
prices and effective exchange rates can produce different results
in the Uptica report for example, "conformity to PPP is consider
ably closer multilaterally than bilaterally" (Thygesen, 1978, p. 306).
f.

Evaluation of Results.

In econometric studies of the PPP relationship one must determine
whether or not fluctuations of price movements across countries are
similar.

This is usually done through the comparison of cross-country

variations with inter-regional or inter-city variations of prices within
specific currency areas(Vaubei 1978, p. 324). The evaluation of econ
ometric findings also gives rise to a broader question ·pertaining to
mis-specification.

Krugman, (1978) has shown, for example, that

simple empirical tests of PPP would provide biased results if the system
(

1

of equatLons is indeed simultaneous.

Specifically, if neither prices nor

exchange rates can properly be regarded as exogenous, one could be led
to reject PPP "in a world in which it is fact valid"
p. 398).

(Krugman, 1978,

This is particularly important in the case of real disturbances.
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In addition to the fact that the validity of PPP in the case of
real disturbances is questionable on theoretical grounds, the argument
points to the deficiencies of ordinary least squares for the purposes
of estimating a simultaneous system.
The above set of questions apply to all empirical studies of the
PPP relationship and are at the center of the debate on the empirical
validity of Purchasing Power Parity.

A.

Tests of the Commodity Arbitrage Relationship
Recent empirical tests of the 'law of one price' have produced

negative results.

In a series of studies, Kravis and Lipsey (1971,

1974, 1978) question the perfect commodity arbitrage assumption both
for individual commodities and specialized subsets of goods.

They

show, for example, that there exist both substantial deviations from
the law of one price for traded commodities as well as explicit
price discrimination on the part of sellers who often charge different·
prices for products depending on the final destination point
(Kravis and Lipsey,1978, p. 234).

Isard's (1974) comparisons of monthly

Japanese, German and U.S. export prices for the period Jan. 1968 to
Nov. 1973 also show significant variability in cross-country export
prices pointing to low substitutability of export commodities across
the major industrial countries.

Neither do Bordo and Choudhry's

(1977) comparisons of quarter y:price indexes for eighteen industry

1

groups in the United States and Canada give much support to the
arbitrage model.

The coefficient of the change in foreign prices in

simple one-equation estimates is significantly different from unity,
while the bilateral price-adjusted exchange rate varies substantially
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over time.

In a recent study involving comparisons of major commodity

prices in Canada and the United States over the period 1965-1974,
Richardson (1978) ~lso shows that perfect colilIOC>dity arbitrage can be re
jected with 95 percent confidence for every commodity group in his
sample (Richardson, 1978, p. 347).
More positive results are presented by Genberg (1975).
who finds that quarterly price changes of a cluster of commoditie& 6in eight different locations follow

similar patterns.

Overall however, with the possible exception of goods that are
traded in the major commodity exchanges, the evidence suggests that
spatial commodity arbitrage is far from perfect.

B.

Transmission of Foreign Price Disturbances Under Fixed Exchange Rates
As we have seen in Section I,Purchasing Power Parity under fixed

exchange rates would imply that cross-country inflation rates would
tend to converge.

Genberg (1978) and Hooper and Lowrey (1979) present

comprehensive reviews of existing empirical tests on the international
transmission of price disturbances.

In the simplest kind of model,

relative PPP would indicate that the long-run value of the coefficients,
a

1

and

8

1

in equations

while coefficient

e0

4 . and

4' below would be equal to unity

would be equal to zero:
(4 )

Genberg (1977a) estimated these equations for ten European countries
using yearly data on consumer price indexes for the time period 1955-1970.
6

Cocoa, copper, copra, jute, rubber and tin.
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The results proved to conform to those expected.
In addition to the foreign price level, a number of recent econometric
studies

attempt to capture the effects of expectations and of excess demand

as well as the influence of domestic policies on the domestic price level.
Dornbusch and Krugman (1976) do a number of tests for major indus
trial countries to determine the elasticity of domestic export and con
sumer prices to foreign competitors' prices during the period 1960-1972.
Their results vary substantially across countries.
the United States
manufactured goods is

They find that in

the principal determinant of unit export values for
unit labor costs rather than foreign prices. In

Canada and France,on the other hand, there is substantial sensitivity
to foreign competitors' prices with relevant elasticities of .64 and
.66 for each country respectively.

Their tests of the impact of import

prices on domestic consumer prices duri~g the period 1955-75 is also
revealing.

Whereas the effect of import prices on the CPI is not negli-

gible, the elasticity coefficients are much below tnlity.
~n~

7

Other independ-

v~r;~hles su~h as the GDP gap, a labor market variable and a lagged

dependent variable are equally if not more significant.

(Dornbusch

and

Krugman, 1976, p. 571).
Similar tests were conducted by Modigliani and Papademos (1975);
according to their estimates for the period 1953-1971, the import price
elasticity in the United States of the nonfood component of the CPI
with respect to import prices was about o.• l after one year and 0.3 in
7The highest one is .33 fb~ Switzerland; the coefficient for the
United States is .14.
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the long run.

Similarly Spitaller's (1978) estimate for the steady-state

elasticity of domestic prices with respect to import prices is about .27.
These findings are consistent with those of other authors (Krause
and Salant, 1977) who in general report low elasticities of the CPI with
respect to import prices for a number of OECD countries.

One of the most

significant explanatory variables in most one-equation regression estimates
seems to be the excess demand variable.

This could be interpreted, as

Genberg points out (Genberg, 1978, p. 255), as evidence that even under
fixed exchange rates there is substantial scope for inflation rates to
diverge.

It is important however to note that if cycles in economic acti

vity tend to be synchronized internationally then "excess demand in any
particluar economy is merely a reflection of generalized excess demand
the world over" (Genberg, 19 78, p. 255).

If that is im.lt!t!cl the cai:;e, Lhe

presence of multicollinearity between the foreign price and excess demand
variable might substantially lower the relevant coefficients.
There are a few models which es_timate a whole system of
ta.uc::uu::; t:'-{UdLiun~.

i:;imul-

The focus of the so-called Seandinavian model {Aukrust,

1972; Edgren G. and Faxen K. and Odhner

c.,

1973) and more recent work in

this same tradition (Calmfors,1977) links foreign prices directly to
the price of traded goods in the economy; the effect of foreign prices
is then transmitted to the non-traded goods sector via the wage level
which is determined in the traded good sector. The coefficient for changes
in world market prices in the traded-goo4 price equation is not significantly different from one (.78) ozr the 5 per cent level, while price changes
for nontradables seem to be determined exclusively by unit labor costs and
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expected price increases . (Calmfors , 1977, pp. 507-509).

of

Price equations are also included in most macroecon omic 11X>dels
8
the major industria l countries .
It can be generally concluded

that the impact or long-run effect of foreign prices on the domestic
price level is quite low and significa ntly lower than unity.
C.

"Causalit y" Tests of the PPP Relations hip
The early tests of the PPP relations hip under floating exchange

rates involved time series compariso ns of PPP with the actual exchange
rate.

The methodolo gy and findings of these early studies which

included articles by Cassel (1916), Keynes (1923), Angell (1926),
Heckscher (1930) and others has been reviewed thoroughl y by Officer
(1976); while there seems to be enough disagreem ent among authors,
Officer concludes that the PPP doctrine seems on average to hold quite
well.
Recent empirical studies have increasin ely
as the major methodolo gical tool.

URPil

regressio n analysis

While in the early studies

"causalit y"

was implicit in the conduct of empirical tests, the use of indepe.nde nt vari
ables in regressio n analysis by necessity underline s the exogeneit y or predetermination of some va~iables at least in a statistic al if not theoretic al way.
Frenkel (1978) uses monthly data on exchange rates (St), domestic

*
(Pt) and foreign (Pt) price indexes for the period February 1922-May
1925 to estimate the following equations :

in S
and

t

6in st

= a+ b .2.n Pt - b

=

b 6.2,n pt

*

in p *
t

*
b * 6inP,t
(

I

~or a good overview see Genberg, 1978, p. 258.

(5 )

(5' )
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Adopting the hypotheses that b

= b*

and that b = b * = 1, he then

compares the obtained results with the hypothetical
standard F-test.

values using a

Three different kind of price indexes are used in

the process, namely the wholesale, material and food price index.

The

evidence is uneven for both the absolute and relative versions of PPP
with some bilateral exchange rates following closely PPP while others not. Frenke
argues that overall the results seem to be positive. (Frenkel, 1978, p. 180).
In early tests of the PPP relationship no distinction was drawn
between short and long run.

In emphasizing this distinction, Frenkel (19 78)

assumes a long-run PPP relationship given by

(6)

and then a short-run partial adjustment process according to which the percentage
rate of change of the exchange rate is proportional to the (logarithm
of the) ratio of the long-run value to the actual exchange rate.
(Fr,:,nk<>l, 1Q7R,

p. 181),

Thus,

(7 )

Combining ( 6) and ( 7) he then estimates eauation ( 8) h,-_low!

(8 )

•t
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Th'e long-run elasticit y (b) turns out in fact to be close to
unity.
In evaluatin g the results obtained by an earlier but similar
study by Frenkel (1976) and Bilson (1978), Krugman (1978) argues that
favorable results are obtained for those countries which in the 1920's
experienc ed rapid if not hyper inflation and which pursued expansion ary
monetary policies.

Results however from equivalen t tests in the 1970's,

when the major disturban ces have been real, are not as supportiv e of the
PPP hypothesi s as Frenkel's conclusio ns would lead one to expect (Krugman,
1978, p. 400).
There are a number of recent studies which explicitl y test the
monetary approach to exchange rate determina tion (Bilson, 1978a, 1978b;
Hodrick, 1978).

Their analysis incorpora tes

the quantity theory of money

and a strict PPP relations hip between domestic and foreign price levels. 9
The equations estimated by Ho<lrick (1978) on monthly data for Germany (4/739/75) and the United Kingdom (7/72-6/7 5) are based on the following
formulati on:

i)
t

+
( 9)

In equation ( 9), the logarithm of the exchange rate is regressed
against the logarithm s of the domestic and foreign money stocks (m and
m*), the logarithm s of domestic_ and foreign interest rates (it and it)
*
and finally the logarithm s of real per capita permanent incomes.
.
.
I I
For an excellent review 'see Dornbusch (1978).

Ac-
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cording to the

monetary theory

to be plus and minus unity.

the coefficients c

1

and c * are expected
1

The coefficients of the domestic interest

rates and foreign income level are expected to be positive while the
coefficients of foreign interest rates and domestic income are
expected to be negative. 10
Even though estimates have the right sign the results are mixed
for both countries.

Some coefficients are not significant while

there are also high estimates of serial correlation.
More importantly in a similar study Bilson (1978b) compared his
results, based on a version of equation ( 9 ) , with those derived from
a strict PPP relationship and those from a random-walk model.

The following

was concluded:
Although .[the "monetary approach" equation.] appears
to fit the data more closely than the Purchasing-Power
Parity equation, it is noticeably inferior to the random
walk model in terms of R-squared, standard error, and
the extent of the autocorrelation of the residuals.
Consequently, although the monetary model does explain
over 90 percent of the variation in the exchange rate,
these results lead to the rejection of the monetary
model as a complete description of the determination
of the exchange rate.
(Bilson,1978, p. 89)

lOAn increase in the domestic interest rate is assumed to lead to a
depreciation of the currency rather than an appreciation for the follow
ing reason:

the increase in it.will reduce demand for real money balances

which will induce an increase in the price level to maintain equilibrium
in the money markets.

With pric~s getting out of line internationally, a

depreciation is required to restore PPP (Dornbusch, 1978, p. 8).

38

D.

Variability of Real Exchange Rates
Tests of the long-run variability of real exchange rates have

served as a convenient method for accessing departures from Purchasing
Power Parity.
In cases where exchange-rate changes have been shown to conform
to inflation differentials so that the value of real exchange rates
has remained constant, a PPP-based intervention rule has been proposed
as the main criterion for managing exchange rates

(Thygesen, 1978).

Test of the long-run variability of real exchange rates have also
been used by some authors (Vaubel, 1978) as comprehensive and operation
al criteria of the comparative costs and benefits of monetary unifica
tion.

This latter type of study is outside the realm of PPP and

therefore beyond the scope of this essay.
Genberg (1978) has investigated the relationship between exchange
rates and their corresponding Purchasing Power Parity levels with
the aim of determining (a) the bias in PPP when J11easured by the CPI's,
(b) the speed of adjustment towards PPP following a disturbance and
(c) the potential shifts in the PPP relationship due to intercountry
differences in index construction {Genberg, 1978, p. 265).

He has

estimated the following equations for fourteen industrialized countries
for the whole period 1957-1972:

log (eeff
i,t

I ;
Peff/P
) =a+ bt + u
i,t i,t

(10)

0
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In estim ating equat ion (10) effec tive excha nge rates and
price
level s are used; the const ant a is includ ed so that the
data can
determ ine the appro priate base year while the time trend
is a proxy
for facto rs that may produ ce a bias in PPP calcu lation
.
The error term of equat ion (10) serve s as an indic ator
of depar tures
from PPP.

Genbe rg finds that the avera ge absol ute perce ntage devia
tion

from PPP incre ased from 1.3% in 1957- 1966 to 2.2% in 19671972 and
final ly to 4.1% in 1973- 1976.

This incre ase can be large ly attrib uted

to the IOOve towar ds flexib le excha nge rates and the preva
lence of
real- side distur bance s durin g the 70's.
Genbe rg also finds a length ening of the time lag betwe
en the
origi nal distur bance and the reesta blishm ent of PPP under
flexib le
excha nge rates as compa red to fixed excha nge rate perio
ds as well as
syste matic biase s in PPP when measu red by the CPI; he
attrib utes those
to a highe r than unity income elast icity of demand for
nontr aded goods
and a highe r share of govern ment vs priva te expen diture
s in total
consu mptio n expen diture s on home comm oditie s (Genp erg
1 1978; Po 267).
Overa ll his resul ts point to "a marke d infer iority of
the Purch asing
Power Parit y relati onshi p durin g the flexi ble excha nge
rate years as
compa red to the earli er years of fixed or adjus table excha
nge rates "
(Genb erg, 1978, p. 268).
In contr ast to the above , the Optic a repor t writt en for
the
Comm ission of the Europ ean Comm unities seems to adopt
the view that
PPP can be used as an objec tiv~ 'crite rion for excha nge
rate adjus tment s.
This concl usion is based on a cross -sect ion study of

effec tive

excha nge rate chang es for 18 count ries durin g the 196375 perio d.
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le Pric e Inde x as the mai n inde x
The stud y,w hich opte d for the Who lesa
ity to PPP was con side rabl y clos er
to be used , ind icat ed tha t con form
abo ut as clos e in a wid e grou p of
mu ltila tera lly than bila tera lly and
ng the EC. (see Thy gese n, 197 8,
16 ind ustr ial cou ntri es as it is amo
sug ges ts tha t "the mec hani sms whi ch
pp. 306 -7). This con clus ion whi ch
ting
sure d in a common num erai re in a floa
alig n nati ona l infl atio n rate s mea
ntly than the mec hani sms whi ch
rate syst em hav e wor ked more effi cie
n exch ange rate s are larg ely fixe d"
alig n nati ona l infl atio n rate s •.• whe
p con tras t with the ear lier res ults
(Th yge sen, 197 8, p. 307 ), is in shar
obta ined by Gen berg (197 8).
sch (197 8) has look ed at the
In an effo rt to eva luat e PPP, Dor nbu
tes and Germany, usin g the CPI
rea l exch ange rate for the Uni ted Sta
x. lie foun d tha t thP rea l exch ange
inde x as the app rop riat e pric e intle
whi ch wer e sys tem atic ally asso ciat ed
rate showed sub stan tial dev iati ons
con tr~~ v to wha t a stri ct adh eren ce
with movements in the exch ange rate
Fur ther mor e
8, P.•_ 24) .
to PPP wou ld ind icat e (Do rnbu sch· , 197
t for a con side rabl e peri od of
dev iati ons from PPP wer e foun d to las
dev iati ons to sec tora l chan ges in
tim e. Dor nbu sch attr ibu tes thes e
pric ing stra teg ies and fina lly
rela tive pric es ove r tim e, diff ere nt
ies acro ss cou ntri es.
diff eren ces in pric e and wage rig idit
ch com pute s
Fin ally , in an inte rest ing stud y whi
s und er spe cifi c lev els of
Tur key 's "eq uili briu m" exch ange rate
assu min g diff ere nt ex°. geno us
~orr owi ng and net cap ital infl ows by
vis and Rob inso n con clud e tha t
_sho cks and ·doi oost ic resp ons es/ ber
orta nt exp lana tion of th~
"di ffer ent ial infl atio n, whi le an imp
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underlying change, only explains about a third of the change in the
equilibrium exchange rate •.•• " (Dervis and Robinson, 1978, p. 57).
Changes in workers' remittances, changes in the investment rate and
residual factors turn out to be important determinants of the
equilibrium exchange rate; their share in the total change in the
equilibrium exchange rate exceeds 50 percent.

These are the typical

kind of disturbances that semi-industrialized countries face.

One

would thus expect PPP to hold even less for those countries which
in the process of development undergo structural changes and are
subjected to real as well as monetary disturbances.

III

Conclusions
One of the most important questions that emereeR from thP. analysis

of theoretical and empirical studies on PPP is the nature and significance
of disturbances in the international monetary system.

This question

divided economists as early as the 18th century; in the 1930's it was
the focus cf the debate between Keynes (1929) and Ohlin (1929) in
relation to the German reparation pay~nts; it is also the central
issue that distinguishes the different approaches to the balance
of payments.

In addressing himself to this question, Tobin stresses

what he views as the prevalence of real side disturbances in recent
economic history:
•••• In the twenties, the disturbances had to do with
reparations and war deb~s, the transfer problem, pro·
tectionism in the United States, and such matters.
They had monetary consequences, but they were not mone
tary in origin. Then came the Great Depression, for
which a model that assumes real output and employment
to be constant in every country at full employment
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levels is not particularly helpful. My mind jumped
to the dollar shortage of the 1950s, and I tried to think
how that was monetarily determined.
Next was the structural disequilibrium between
the United States and Europe and Japan, which characterized
the late fifties and early sixties, the dollar glut
following the dollar shortage. The dollar glut produced
virtually no inflation, even in the United States. The
"monetary" model did not seem to illuminate this balance
of payments disequilibrium any better than it did pre
vious disturbances~ The inflation set off by the finan
cing of the Vietnam War seems at least equally the result
of bad fiscal policy as of monetary policy.
Finally, there are the oil and food crises. At a
1974 conference on monetarism--domestic monetarism--some
body asked how I knew that the quadrupling of ~il prices
by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries was
not a response to increases in the world money supply.
I suppose I do not!
CI'obin, 1977, p. 57 ).
Such views would be in sharp contrast with views held by the monetarist
school.
The nature of disturbances is intimately linked to the validity
of the Purchasing Power Parity doctrine.

As we have seen,

the argument that the equilibrium exchange rate will tend in the long run to
equal its PPP level can be made only in the case of monetary disturbances
and even then under restrictive assumptions regarding interest payments and
wealth effects.

Deviations from PPP on the other hand could be large in the

case of real shocks and even more substantial in the short run independently
of the source of disturbance.
These theoretical shortcomin'gs and questions tend to be overlooked in
empirical tests which often involve a circular reasoning:
(

if the obtained

I

results are favorable to PPP then one uses them to support the contention
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that disturbances are mainly monetary; if the results are not favorable,
and assuming that people can agree about that, then one is apt to
emphasize real and structural disturbances as the important shocks
in the system.

Thus, the evaluation of the empirical work on PPP can

become both difficult and misleading.
In conclusion, I am afraid there is an important element of truth in
Paul Samuelson's (1964) statement that, 'unless very sophisticated indeed,
PPP is a misleading, pretentious doctrine, promising us what is rare
in economics, detailed numerical predictions ••• "
(Samuelson, 1964, p. 153).

(
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